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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 28, 2009, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Forest 
Grove School District v. T.A.,1 a case that addresses a deeply contested issue 
in special education litigation.  Reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 
Forest Grove, the Court will decide whether the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act (IDEA)2 entitles parents to reimbursement for their 
child’s private school education if the child has never received special edu-
cation services provided by a public school.3  Forest Grove represents the 
latest of many cases to perpetuate the circuit split on this issue.  In fact, in 
2007, the Supreme Court addressed the same question in Board of Educa-
tion v. Tom F.4  Just two weeks before the Court heard argument in Tom F., 
however, Justice Kennedy recused himself,5 resulting in a 4-4, non-
precedential decision affirming the Second Circuit’s grant of reimbursement 
to parents facing circumstances similar to those presented in Forest Grove.6  




*  J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2009; B.A., Duke University, 2005.  Thanks to Hil-
lary Coustan, Scott Lerner, Dave Baltmanis, and the Colloquy Board. 
1
  Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 987 (2009) (No. 08-305) (argued Apr. 
28, 2009), decision below at Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008) (link). 
2
  20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006) (link). 
3
  It is a settled question that the IDEA entitles parents to reimbursement for their child’s private 
school tuition if the public school cannot or will not provide the child with an appropriate public educa-
tion. Burlington Sch. Comm. v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (link). 
4
  128 S. Ct. 1 (2007) (mem.) (link). 
5
  Tony Mauro, Will Justice Kennedy Recuse Again?, LAW.COM, Oct. 21, 2008, 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202425400784 (link). 
6
  Id.; see Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 193 Fed. App’x. 26 (2d Cir. 2006). 
7
  Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006) (link). 
8
  Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008) (link). 
9
  M.M. ex rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006) (link). 
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bility of reimbursement, while in contrast, the First Circuit10 has refused to 
do so. 
Because of the growing divide between the circuits, many parents of 
children with disabilities face uncertainty about whether they will be reim-
bursed if they choose to enroll their children in private schools.11  The Su-
preme Court should end parents’ uncertainty by affirming the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Forest Grove and holding that parents who enroll their 
child in private school before that child has received publicly provided spe-
cial education services are not precluded from tuition reimbursement under 
the IDEA.  The language and intent of the IDEA and the balance of policy 
considerations support the Ninth Circuit’s decision.  More importantly, the 
Court should capitalize on its opportunity to refine the judicial approach to 
private school reimbursement cases by adopting an analytical framework 
that encourages parents and schools to cooperate more closely.   
II. BACKGROUND: THE LAW AND FACTS BEHIND FOREST GROVE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT V. T.A. 
A. Reimbursement for Private School Tuition under the IDEA 
Congress enacted the IDEA ―to ensure that all children with disabilities 
have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes 
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs. . 
. .‖12  The IDEA provides comprehensive procedural safeguards13 and em-
powers parents as ―equal partners with school personnel in the education of 
their children.‖14  Accordingly, the IDEA is structured to encourage parents 
to collaborate with school districts in developing Individualized Education 
Plans (IEP) that provide the special education services necessary for their 
children to receive a free appropriate public education.15  If parents are not 
satisfied with the special education services offered to their child, they may 





  Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004) (link). 
11
  Last year, nearly half of the parents who enrolled their children in private schools because they 
needed special education services did so while facing such uncertainty.  Joseph Goldstein, 9 Could Res-
cue Disabled Pupils: Top Court Takes N.Y. Case on Tuition Reimbursement, NYSUN.COM, Feb. 27, 
2007, http://www.nysun.com/new-york/9-could-rescue-disabled-pupils/49334/ (link). 
12
  20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006) (link). 
13
  See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(6) , 1415 (2006) (link to § 1412) (link to § 1415); see also Allan G. 
Osborne, Jr., Is a Parent Who Places a Child with a Disability in a Private School Entitled to Tuition 
Reimbursement if the Child Has Never Attended a Public School? Board of Education of the City of 
New York v. Tom F., 219 ED. LAW REP. 887, 887 (2007). 
14
  Osborne, Jr., supra note 13, at 887; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B) (2006) (―The purposes of 
this chapter are—to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are 
protected.‖).  
15
  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) (2006). 
16
  20 U.S.C §§ 1415(b)(6), 1415(f) (2006). 
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final administrative decisions by bringing a civil action in state or federal 
court.17   
Because the IDEA did not explicitly address private school tuition 
reimbursement before 1997, the Supreme Court found the authority to grant 
such reimbursement in the IDEA’s broad ―appropriate‖ relief provision,  
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).18  This sweeping provision empowers courts reviewing 
administrative decisions with the discretion ―to grant such relief as the court 
determines is appropriate.‖19  In School Committee of Burlington v. De-
partment of Education, the Court interpreted § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to ―confer 
broad discretion‖20 that authorizes private school tuition reimbursement 
when the school district fails to provide a free appropriate public educa-
tion.21  After noting that judicial review under the IDEA is a ―ponderous,‖ 
slow process,22 the Court in Burlington stated: 
 
[T]he parents who disagree with the proposed IEP are faced 
with a choice: go along with the IEP to the detriment of 
their child if it turns out to be inappropriate or pay for what 
they consider to be the appropriate placement.  If they 
choose the latter course, which conscientious parents who 
have adequate means and who are reasonably confident of 
their assessment normally would, it would be an empty vic-
tory to tell them several years later that they were right but 
that these expenditures could not in a proper case be reim-
bursed by the school officials.  If that were the case, the 
child’s right to a free appropriate public education, the par-
ents’ right to participate fully in developing the proper IEP, 






  20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)–(i) (2006); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 3, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.Ct. 987 (2009) (No. 08-305), 2005 WL 870018 
(link). 
18
  Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir. 2008); see 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006). 
19
  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006). 
20
  Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (link). 
21
  Id. at 370; see also Florence County Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15–16 (1993) (reaf-
firming the Court’s finding in Burlington that the IDEA authorizes private school reimbursement) (link). 
    Although Burlington and Carter involved children who had received publicly provided special 
education services before their parents enrolled them in private school, neither decision holds that re-
ceipt of such services constitutes a prerequisite for tuition reimbursement.  Moreover, ―following Bur-
lington, lower courts routinely awarded reimbursement to parents of children who had not previously 
received public special education.‖  Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 14–15. 
22
  Burlington, 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985) (―As this case so vividly demonstrates, . . . the review 
process is ponderous.  A final judicial decision on the merits of an IEP will in most instances come a 
year or more after the school term covered by that IEP has passed.‖). 
23
  Id.  
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This pronouncement underpins the Court’s holding in Burlington and 
echoes throughout subsequent decisions that confirm courts’ power to grant 
tuition reimbursement under the IDEA.24  
In 1997, Congress amended the IDEA to address explicitly private 
school tuition reimbursement under a new section, entitled ―Payment for 
education of children enrolled in private schools without consent of or re-
ferral by the public agency.‖25  The following provision of this section in-
cludes the statutory language at issue in Forest Grove: 
 
If the parents of a child with a disability, who previously 
received special education and related services under the 
authority of a public agency, enroll the child in a private 
elementary school or secondary school without the consent 
of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing of-
ficer may require the agency to reimburse the parents for 
the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing officer 
finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public 
education available to the child in a timely manner prior to 
that enrollment.26 
 
Forest Grove presents the question of whether, by adopting the 1997 
amendments, Congress barred private school tuition reimbursement for stu-
dents who have not ―previously received special education and related ser-
vices.‖27  Or, do ―those students remain eligible for private school 
reimbursement, as they were before 1997,‖ under the IDEA’s broad ―ap-
propriate‖ relief provision, § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)?28  The facts in Forest Grove 
provide context for this difficult question.  
B. Facts and Procedural History in Forest Grove 
After T.A. attended public school from kindergarten until the spring of 
his junior year, his parents removed him and placed him in private school.29  
Although T.A. ―experienced difficulty paying attention in class,‖ depended 
on extensive help from his family to complete his schoolwork, and was eva-





  See, e.g., Carter, 510 U.S. at 12; Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 369 (2d Cir. 2006); 
M.M. ex. rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1098–99 (11th Cir. 2006) (link); Greenland Sch. Dist. v. 
Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 158 (1st Cir. 2004). 
25
  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) (2006). 
26
  Id. (emphasis added). 
27
  Id.  
28
  Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th Cir. 2008). 
29
  Id. at 1081. 
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cation services while enrolled in public school.30  When school staff mem-
bers evaluated T.A. during internal meetings that did not involve his 
parents, they considered the possibility that T.A. had Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).‖31  Instead of testing him for ADHD, 
however, T.A. was formally evaluated for a learning disability, and the 
school’s psychologists and educational specialists unanimously concluded 
that he had no such disability.32  Accordingly, the school psychologist’s re-
port indicated that T.A. was not eligible for special education services under 
the IDEA, though he may have been eligible for accommodations under § 
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.33  The school district never followed 
up on either the suggestion that T.A. had ADHD or that he might be eligible 
for § 504 accommodations.34  When T.A. continued to experience difficulty 
in school, his mother contacted school administrators multiple times ex-
pressing her concerns and proposing that the school reevaluate him.35  The 
school district told T.A.’s mother that a subsequent evaluation would not 
likely find T.A. eligible for special education services.36  The district offered 
no other assistance.37 
T.A. continued to fall behind in school and, in 2002, he began using 
marijuana and ―exhibit[ing] noticeable personality changes.‖38  In 2003, 
T.A. ran away from home and ultimately ended up in a hospital emergency 
room.39  His parents then hired a psychologist, who ―diagnosed T.A. with 
ADHD, depression, math disorder, and cannabis abuse.‖40  Upon the psy-
chologist’s advice, in March of 2003 T.A.’s parents removed him from pub-
lic school and ultimately enrolled him in Mount Bachelor Academy, a 
private school intended for students with special needs.41  Four days after 





  Id.  
31
  Id.  Notes from two separate meetings included: Jan. 16, 2001—―Maybe ADD/ADHD?,‖ and 
Feb. 13, 2001—―suspected ADHD.‖  Id. 
32
  Id.  
33
  Id.  The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is a civil rights statute that broadly prohibits discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.  See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006) (link).  As the IDEA is devoted spe-
cifically to students with disabilities, the two statutes provide different, but sometimes overlapping, spe-
cial education services. 
34
  Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1081  
35
  See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 37, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (No. 05-35641); Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 5.  In her e-mail, T.A.’s mother 
expressed concern that T.A. ―apparently cannot process information or learn from the teaching methods 
used thus far‖ and suggested that ―there must be some method of teaching more appropriate for him.‖  
Id. (citation omitted). 
36
  Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 35, at 37.  
37
  Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 5. 
38
  See Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1081–82. 
39
  Id. 
40
  Id. at 1082. 
41
  Id. 
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them to request a hearing under the IDEA and to seek an order commanding 
the school to evaluate T.A. for disabilities.42  The team of specialists assem-
bled to evaluate T.A. ―acknowledged T.A.’s learning difficulties, his diag-
nosis of ADHD, and his depression,‖43 but nonetheless concluded that T.A. 
did not qualify for special education services under the IDEA ―because 
those diagnoses did not have a severe effect on T.A.’s educational perfor-
mance.‖44   
Following the school district’s evaluation, an administrative hearing 
officer concluded that T.A. ―was disabled and therefore eligible for special 
education under the IDEA and [§] 504.‖45  The hearing officer further con-
cluded that the school district had failed to provide T.A. a free appropriate 
public education, and accordingly was required to reimburse T.A.’s parents 
for sending him to Mount Bachelor, which cost $5,200 per month.46  The 
District Court reversed, leading T.A.’s parents to appeal to the Ninth Cir-
cuit.47  The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision and re-
manded the case for further consideration consistent with its determination 
that T.A.’s parents were eligible for private school tuition reimbursement—
despite the fact that T.A. never received special education services while 
enrolled in public school.48  Both the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and wider 
policy implications support its decision.  
III. WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM FOREST GROVE AND 
REFINE THE COURT’S ANALYSIS 
A. The Second Circuit Correctly Interpreted the IDEA 
In deciding Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Second Cir-
cuit’s statutory analysis in Frank G. v. Board of Education,49 a case with 
similar facts.50  Because that analysis was sound and firmly rooted in the 
text, structure, and history of the IDEA, the Supreme Court should affirm 
Forest Grove.   
The Second Circuit first determined that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is ambi-
guous because the plain language of the provision ―does not say that tuition 





  Id.  
43
  Id.  
44
  Id. 
45
  Id. at 1082–83. 
46
  Id.  
47
  Id. at 1083. 
48
  Id. at 1088–89. 
49
  459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006). 
50
  Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1086 (―We agree with and adopt the analysis and conclusion of the 
Second Circuit.‖). 
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ceived special education and related services from a public agency.‖51  Ad-
ditionally, the Second Circuit recognized the continuing validity of the 
Burlington Court’s finding that the IDEA’s general ―appropriate‖ relief 
provision52 confers ―broad discretion‖ that authorizes private school tuition 
reimbursement.53  The Court stated that the re-enactment of this provision in 
1997, ―without change, is significant because it can be presumed that Con-
gress intended to adopt the construction given to it by the Supreme Court 
and made that construction part of the enactment.‖54   
Applying ―traditional canons of statutory construction,‖ the Second 
Circuit explored the broad purpose of the IDEA and found that the statute 
―was intended to give handicapped children both an appropriate education 
and a free one; it should not be interpreted to defeat one or the other of 
those objectives.‖55  The court then noted that interpreting  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to bar tuition reimbursement for parents whose child 
had not previously received publicly provided special education services 
would lead to ―absurd results‖ that involve withholding reimbursement 
from parents whose children indeed meet the IDEA’s requirements.56  Final-
ly, the Second Circuit noted that its interpretation converged with both the 
position of the Department of Education’s Office of Special Education & 
Rehabilitative Services and the statute’s legislative history.57 
B. Policy Considerations Supporting the Ninth Circuit’s Decision 
Reversing Forest Grove could produce consequences that contravene 
the IDEA’s purpose and essentially ―deprive a child of a free and appropri-
ate education when all the fault lay with the public school.‖58  As the Ninth 
Circuit recognized, reading § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a categorical bar would 
require parents of a child with a disability to preserve their right to reim-
bursement by accepting publicly provided special education services even if 





  Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368 (emphasis in original). 
52
  20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006). 
53
  Frank G., 459 F.3d at 369–70. 
54
  Id.  
55
  Id. at 372 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985)) (in-
ternal quotations omitted); see also Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1086 (summarizing the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning in Frank G.). 
56
  Frank G., 459 F.3d at 372; Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1086.  See infra text accompanying notes 
58–65 (detailing the absurd results that would follow the reversal of Forest Grove). 
57
  Frank G., 459 F.3d at 372–73 (―We do not view § 612(a)(10)(C) [20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)] as 
foreclosing categorically an award of reimbursement in a case in which a child has not yet been enrolled 
in special education and related services under the authority of a public agency.‖ (quoting Letter to Su-
san Luger, listed in 65 Fed.Reg. 9178 (Feb. 23, 2000) and reprinted in 33 I.D.E.L.R. 126 (Mar. 19, 
1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
58
  Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 27. 
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rate with them to formulate an effective IEP.59  The Forest Grove school 
district contends that parents should be required merely to ―give the IEP a 
try and send their child to public school,‖ even for a very short time pe-
riod.60  However, requiring enrollment in public school as a prerequisite to 
tuition reimbursement could disrupt a child’s education and produce psy-
chologically damaging consequences: 
 
Appropriate education during a child’s formative years is 
critical to a child’s development.  Moving a child from one 
school to another can be highly disruptive to the child, both 
educationally and psychologically.  That is true for any 
youth; it may be especially true for a child with a disability.  
It would be absurd to conclude that Congress created a re-
gime whereby parents would have to compound the educa-
tional difficulties their children have by subjecting them to 
inappropriate schools merely to qualify for tuition reim-
bursement.61 
 
Even if a child accepts inadequate services while his parents work with 
the school district to develop an appropriate IEP, the resulting negotiation 
process could last indefinitely.  All the while, the child must endure insuffi-
cient services that deny him the free appropriate education the IDEA prom-
ises.62  The child’s inadequate education may be prolonged still further if 
the parents’ negotiations with the district fail and the parents initiate an ad-
ministrative hearing and eventually appeal to federal court.63   
In addition, ―if the school district declined to recognize a student as 
disabled—as occurred in [Forest Grove]—the student would never receive 
special education in public school and therefore would never be eligible for 
reimbursement . . . .‖64  Most cynically, reversing Forest Grove would al-
low—and even incentivize—school districts to ―avoid any obligation to 
reimburse private-school tuition simply by refusing to provide special edu-





  Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087; see also M.M. ex. rel. C.M. v. Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085, 1099 
(11th Cir. 2006) (stating that ―the School Board’s disturbing interpretation would . . . place parents . . . 
in the untenable position of acquiescing to an inappropriate placement in order to preserve their right to 
reimbursement‖ (quoting Justin G. v. Bd. of Educ., 148 F.Supp.2d 576, 587 (D. Md. 2001)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).    
60
  Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. 08-305 (U.S. argued Apr. 
28, 2009) (link).  
61
  Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 25–26. 
62
  See Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985). 
63
  During oral argument, Justice Souter seemed especially concerned that litigation could ―go on for 
years‖ while the student languishes in an improper educational placement.  Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 60, at 8.  
64
  Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087 (emphasis in original). 
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those services and is entitled to them under IDEA.‖65  During oral argument, 
Justice Stevens suggested that, under the school district’s approach, by 
adamantly denying that a student is eligible for special education services, a 
school district may permanently shield itself from liability for tuition reim-
bursement.66 
Some commentators have argued that policy implications in fact mili-
tate against affirming Forest Grove.  These commentators fear that Forest 
Grove may increase school districts’ costs because the districts would be 
required both to defend against increased litigation by parents and to pay 
for the private school tuition of an increasing number of students.67  But as 
Justice O’Connor stated in Florence County School District Four v. Carter: 
 
There is no doubt that Congress has imposed a significant 
financial burden on States and school districts that partici-
pate in IDEA.  Yet public educational authorities who want 
to avoid reimbursing parents for the private education of a 
disabled child can do one of two things: give the child a 
free appropriate public education in a public setting, or 
place the child in an appropriate private setting of the 
State’s choice.  This is IDEA’s mandate, and school offi-
cials who conform to it need not worry about reimburse-
ment claims.68 
 
Under the IDEA, a school district is not liable for the cost of private 
special education services if it affords a child a free appropriate public edu-
cation.69  Accordingly, the simplest and cheapest way for school districts to 
avoid the cost of private school tuition reimbursement is by providing child-
ren in need of special education services with a free appropriate education 
in the first place.  However, if school districts fail to do so, parents must be 
able to turn to effective administrative and judicial procedures to ensure that 





  Brief for the United States, supra note 17, at 17. 
66
  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 60, at 17–18.  Justice Stevens later asked Forest Grove’s 
lawyer, ―Doesn’t your interpretation of the statute create an incentive for the school board to just say, 
we’ll never provide any kind of . . . special education, we will just tough it out?  Because they can’t lose, 
they can’t be liable if they do that . . . .‖  Id. at 19. 
67
  See John W. Borkowski, The 2006–2007 Term of the United States Supreme Court and Its Impact 
on Public Schools, 223 ED. LAW REP. 481, 510 (2007) (link).  
68
  510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993) (link). 
69
  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) (2006). 
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C. An Opportunity to Refine the Approach of Lower Courts to Evaluating 
Parents’ Cooperation with the School District 
In addition to realizing Congress’s intent and furthering the IDEA’s 
policies, affirming Forest Grove would allow the Supreme Court to correct 
the approach of lower courts to implementing a crucial goal of the IDEA—
promoting cooperation between parents and the school district.  Careful ex-
amination of the facts in previous cases reveals that tuition reimbursement 
decisions frequently hinge on the level of cooperation between parents and 
the school district, and as a corollary, the extent to which parents provide 
notice before placing their child in private school.  The more vociferously 
parents alert the school district before removing their child, the greater the 
chance that courts will refuse to read § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a categorical 
bar to private school tuition reimbursement.70   
This observation suggests that the Supreme Court may affirm the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Forest Grove because of T.A.’s parents’ persistent 
communication with the school district.  However, while the Supreme 
Court should indeed affirm Forest Grove, it should also refine the analysis 
that leads to this result.  Instead of allowing the parents’ cooperation with 
the school district to implicitly inform courts’ interpretations of  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), the Supreme Court should instruct lower courts to ana-
lyze parental cooperation under the separate provision designed for this 
purpose—§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).  This provision, entitled ―Limitation on 
reimbursement,‖ allows courts to reduce or deny the amount of reimburse-
ment if parents fail to inform the district that they intend to reject its pro-
posed special education services before removing their child from public 
school.71  By considering parents’ cooperation under this provision, the 
Court would implement the IDEA’s goal of encouraging collaboration be-
tween parents and the district, while avoiding the unintended consequences 
that may accompany a total bar on tuition reimbursement in cases where the 
child has not first received publicly provided special education services. 
Undeniably, one of the central objectives of the IDEA is to promote 
cooperation between parents and the school district as a means to ensure 
that each child in need of special education services receives a free appro-
priate public education.  The First Circuit’s pursuit of this objective largely 
determined its decision to read § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a bar to reimburse-
ment for parents who never notified the school district before removing 
their child from public school.72  According to the First Circuit, the statute 
―serves the important purpose of giving the school system an opportunity, 
before the child is removed, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise 





  See, e.g., Forest Grove, 523 F.3d 1078; M.M. ex. rel. C.M., 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006); 
Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006). 
71
  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa) (2006). 
72
  Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150 (2004). 
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tion can be provided in the public schools.‖73  Some commentators have ar-
gued that this interpretation will induce parents to cooperate with school 
districts rather than prematurely transferring their children to private 
schools.74 
Close examination of the facts in each circuit court case demonstrates 
that courts rely heavily on the level of cooperation between parents and 
school districts in reaching their decisions.  In contrast to the majority of 
circuit courts, the First Circuit, in Greenland School District v. Amy N., read 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as categorically barring private school tuition reim-
bursement when a child has never received publicly provided special educa-
tion services.75  The Greenland court’s anomalous decision, however, may 
best be explained by distinguishing between the facts of that case and the 
facts of cases in other circuits.  In Greenland, the parents transferred their 
daughter to private school before ever notifying her public school that she 
needed special education services.76  The parents first requested that the 
school district evaluate their daughter for special education services approx-
imately one year after they removed her from public school.77  Stating that 
―[t]he point is that there was no notice at all to the school system before Ka-
tie’s removal from Greenland that there was any issue about whether Katie 
was in need of special education services,‖ the First Circuit denied the par-
ents tuition reimbursement.78 
In contrast to the First Circuit, the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have all read § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) to allow tuition reimbursement even 
if a child has never received public special education services.  In the cases 
addressed by each of those circuits, however, the parents had communicated 
with the school district about their child’s special education needs in a more 
active, timely way than had the parents in Greenland.79  Indeed, the Second 
Circuit explicitly recognized this distinction and noted that unlike the par-





  Id. at 160. 
74
  See Borkowski, supra note 67, 510. 
75
  Greenland, 358 F.3d at 159-60. 
76
  Greenland, 358 F.3d at 152–53 (―At no point during [the child’s] time at Greenland did her par-
ents or any of her teachers request that she be evaluated for special education services.‖)  However, ar-
guably, the school district had adequate notice that the child needed special education services as her 
parents informed the school that she had been diagnosed with ADHD, her second, third, and fourth 
grade teachers all employed techniques suggested by her psychiatrist to keep her on task, and her moth-
er, a special education teacher, spent a great deal of time helping her daughter with her homework each 
night.  Id.  
77
  Id.  At this point, in May of 2001, the school district found the child ineligible for special educa-
tion services, though the district eventually reversed its determination in November of 2001 after re-
viewing the diagnosis of the child’s private psychiatrist.  Id. 
78
  Id. at 160. 
79
  See, e.g., Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008); M.M. ex. rel. C.M. v. 
Sch. Bd., 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006); Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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before removing their child from public school.80  Similarly, the Eleventh 
Circuit held that ―reliance on the fact that [the child] never attended public 
school is legally insufficient to deny reimbursement under  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)‖81 where his parents had engaged in extensive negotia-
tions with the school district over the child’s IEP both before they removed 
him from public school and while he attended private school.82   
T.A.’s parents’ communication with the school district in Forest Grove 
aligns his case with those in which courts have granted tuition reimburse-
ment.83  In addition, when it remanded Forest Grove, the Ninth Circuit ap-
propriately instructed the lower court to consider T.A.’s parents’ notice to 
the school district as one of the relevant factors used to determine whether 
to grant reimbursement and how much reimbursement to grant.84  Consis-
tent with the Ninth Circuit’s instruction, the IDEA directs courts addressing 
reimbursement cases to evaluate the extent of notice parents provide the 
school district when they are dissatisfied with their child’s IEP.85  However, 
the circuit courts have inappropriately allowed their consideration of par-
ents’ notice, and parents’ general cooperation with school districts, to influ-
ence their interpretation of the language in § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  When 
reviewing Forest Grove, the Supreme Court should correct this approach by 
instructing courts to confine their analysis of parental notice to the provi-
sion intended by Congress—the limitation on reimbursement in  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).  
If the Court states definitively that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not create 
a categorical bar to private school tuition reimbursement, lower courts will 
be left considering parents’ cooperation with school districts under only  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).  In Frank G., the Second Circuit hinted at this im-
proved analysis when it rejected the Greenland court’s interpretation of  
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as unnecessary because § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) ―makes 
clear Congress’s intent that before parents place their child in private 





  Frank G., 459 F.3d at 376. 
81
  M.M., 437 F.3d 1085, 1098.  
82
  Id. at 1090–93.  Although the Eleventh Circuit decided the legal sufficiency of private school tui-
tion reimbursement for parents whose child never received publicly provided special education services, 
the court noted that C.M. actually had received publicly provided special education services within the 
meaning of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).  Id. at 1098.  The court ultimately denied reimbursement in this case 
because the school board had offered the student a free appropriate education, albeit not in the form pre-
ferred by C.M.’s parents.  Id. at 1103. 
83
  See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text.  In contrast to Greenland, where parents with a 
background in special education waited more than a year to notify the school district, T.A.’s parents 
provided formal notice to the district within one month of T.A.’s enrollment in the private school, upon 
hiring a lawyer.  See Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 36, at 45–46.  
84
  See Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1088–89.  Other factors suggested by the court include the exis-
tence of more appropriate alternative placements, the parents’ effort to secure such placements, and the 
school district’s level of cooperation.  Id. at 1089. 
85
  20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)(I)(aa) (2006). 
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at issue.‖86  The First Circuit’s alternative, clumsier approach to this poli-
cy—reading § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) as a categorical bar to tuition reimburse-
ment for parents whose children never received special education services 
from their school districts—results in the denial of tuition reimbursement to 
parents whose children indeed meet the IDEA’s requirements.87   
One might argue that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) provides the threshold crite-
rion for private school tuition reimbursement—previous receipt of publicly 
provided special education services—and that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) further 
qualifies the right to reimbursement for parents who satisfy the initial re-
quirement.  But this interpretation conflicts with the broader scheme that 
Congress endorsed and refined when it drafted the 1997 amendments to the 
IDEA, and it would bring about results that undermine the IDEA’s 
mandate: to provide a free appropriate public education to all children with 
disabilities.  Most notably, if a school district fails to detect a child’s disa-
bility or refuses to provide special education services, that child’s parents 
could not be reimbursed for the cost of their only practical recourse—
private school.88  The more refined statutory analysis suggested by this Es-
say avoids such inequitable results and better reflects Congress’s intent.  
Moreover, this approach improves transparency in judicial decisionmaking 
by inviting courts to analyze parental cooperation under the statutory provi-
sion that plainly anticipates such consideration. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s review of Forest Grove presents an important 
opportunity to advance special education law while resolving the prevailing 
uncertainty about the availability of tuition reimbursement for children who 
have never received publicly provided special education services.  The in-
tent of the IDEA and weight of the policy implications support the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Forest Grove.  More importantly, the Court should re-
fine the approach to tuition reimbursement cases by confining courts’ eval-
uation of parental cooperation to the appropriate, congressionally intended 
statutory provision.  In the last two special education cases it reviewed, 
Winkelman v. Parma City School District89 and Board of Education of the 
City of New York v. Tom F.,90 the Court recognized the important role par-





  Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 376 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy 
N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 (1st Cir. 2004)) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).  Although the 
Second Circuit disagreed with the Greenland court’s analysis, it agreed with that court’s result.  Id. at 
375–76. 
87
  See supra text accompanying notes 58–65. 
88
  See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
89
  127 S. Ct. 1994 (2007) (link). 
90
  127 S. Ct. 1393 (2007) (link). 
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education mandated by the IDEA.91  When deciding Forest Grove, the 
Court has the opportunity to solidify this interpretation of the IDEA by af-
firming the Ninth Circuit’s decision and advancing a more explicit, transpa-





  For instance, the Court reached its decision in Winkelman after searching the overall statutory 
framework of the IDEA and finding that the statute implicitly grants parents ―independent, enforceable 
rights.‖  127 S. Ct. at 1999. 
